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Abstract 
 
Black hole attack is an attack where a node that responds to RREQ from the source node by 
replying a fake freshness information and false hop count. The black hole nodes do not 
respond to distributed co-operation in routing protocol to absorb all the packets, as a result, 
the network performance will drop. Most previous works are focused on anomaly detection 
through dynamic trusted of the neighbouring nodes. We find out that the internal 
comparisons take a long time. This loss can be shortened by changing the routing 
mechanism. We propose an enhancement of AODV protocol, named EAODV, that is able 
to prevent black hole attacks. The EAODV can find a shortest path of routing discovery 
using A* heuristic search algorithm. Values of hop count and estimate time to reach the 
destination node are used as input in the heuristic equation and one-way hash function is 
used to make a secure value and then to casting it to all neighbouring nodes. Experiments 
were conducted in NS2 to simulate EAODV in different running time with and without 
black hole nodes. The EAODV performance results are indicated better in terms Packet loss 
and Average End-to-End delay. 
 
Keywords: Mobile ad hoc network (MANET), Black hole, Packet dropping,  Malicious 
node, Routing. 
 
Abstrak 
 
Black hole attack adalah serangan di mana sebuah node, merespon RREQ dari node sumber 
dengan informasi dan nilai hop palsu. Black hole node tidak merespon kerjasama 
terdistrbusi dalam protokol routing untuk menyerap semua paket. Hasilnya, kinerja jaringan 
akan turun. Penelitian – penelitian sebelumnya berfokus kepada deteksi anomali melalui 
mekanisme kepercayaan dinamis dari node tetangga. Kami menemukan bahwa 
perbandingan internal cukup memakan waktu. Kerugian ini dapat dipersingkat dengan 
mengubah mekanisme routing. Kami mengusulkan peningkatan protokol AODV, bernama 
EAODV, yang mampu mencegah black hole attack. EAODV dapat menemukan jalur 
terpendek pada routing menggunakan algoritma pencarian A*. Nilai-nilai hop dan 
perkiraan waktu untuk mencapai node tujuan digunakan sebagai input dalam persamaan 
heuristik dan fungsi hash satu arah digunakan untuk membuat nilai yang aman dan 
kemudian di-casting ke semua node tetangga. Percobaan dilakukan pada NS2 untuk 
mensimulasikan EAODV dengan running time berbeda dengan dan tanpa black hole node. 
Pada penelitian ini dapat dilihat bahwa kinerja EAODV lebih baik dalam hal Packet loss 
dan Average End-to-end delay. 
 
Kata kunci: Mobile ad hoc network (MANET), Black hole, Paket hilang,  Node berbahaya, 
Routing. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
MANET is a special wireless network. It has 
an ability  to work in unusual environments 
without infrastructure. Black hole attack exploits  
 
 
the routing protocols to drop the network. Ad-hoc 
on demand vector (AODV) is a famous MANET 
protocol [1]. It depends on a freshness routing 
entries to find a destination node. The routing 
discovery with Route Request (RREQ) and Route 
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Reply (RREP) rely on the hop count and 
destination sequence number. They could be 
fabricated or changed by black hole nodes. In 
most previous work, the researchers focused on 
anomaly detection through dynamic trusted of the 
neighbouring nodes or authentication. As a result, 
the existing MANET protocols do not have any 
fully secure solution to black hole attacks by 
considering the shortest path. The routing 
algorithm in AODV relies on a fresh route to the 
destination node. In AODV, The main goal of 
black hole attacks makes the destination node 
unreachable.  A black hole node does not respond 
to distributed co-operation but they respond to 
RREQ from the source node with false 
information as though it is fresh. However, it will 
absorb all the packets in itself, as a result, the 
network will drop. Furthermore, they re-respond 
to source node with false reply as though it is 
fresh enough path to the destination by the RREP. 
Several previous works are focused on anomaly 
detection through dynamic trusted of the 
neighbouring nodes. The process of internal 
comparisons in their methods take a long time and 
this loss can be shortened by changing the routing 
mechanism. In addition, most of previous 
solutions that proposed to modify the original 
AODV did not have a practical guarantee to 
prevent black hole attacks. Adding a mechanism 
to find a shortest path in routing discovery 
depending on the artificial intelligent heuristic 
search algorithm (A*) is a good solution to 
prevent black hole attacks efficiently and avoid 
waste time [2],[3]. Values of hop count and the 
estimate time that are taken advantage by black 
hole node will be used as input to heuristic 
equation of the new routing algorithm. One-way 
hash function is a strong way that can be a useful 
way to secure hop count value and close this gap 
in AODV. 
The next sections of this paper are arranged 
as follow, Section 2 discusses some related works, 
Section 3 presents the proposed solution and 
Section 4 discusses the experiment setup, results 
and analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Related Works 
 
2.1. The Security Issues of On-Demand Routing 
Protocols 
Hu, Perrig and Johnson [4] proposed a 
secure on-demand ad hoc routing protocol based 
on DSR [5]. The authors proposed shared secret 
key between two nodes, and uses a message 
authentication code (MAC). The study focused on 
using MAC in order to authenticate point to point 
message between these nodes. The proposed 
system ARIADNE is compared with the original 
DSR routing protocol. The system performance 
was reached lower packet overhead around 
(41.7%) compare than un-optimized DSR, and 
about the same on all other metrics. However, 
their scope is limited to the highly optimized 
version of DSR that runs in a trusted environment 
because they do not secure the optimization of 
DSR in the ARIADNE.  
Lu, et al. [6] proposed a secure and efficient 
MANET routing protocol, the SAODV protocol 
based on AODV [1] and BAODV protocol based 
on AODV with black hole attack. The authors 
proposed a direct verification of the destination 
node by using the exchange of random number. 
The study focuses on the use of BAODV that 
means AODV suffers from black hole attack and 
(SAODV) that means AODV with secure 
algorithm. The system performance reached 
around (8%) above the average routing efficiency 
of SAODV than AODV and same on all other 
metrics. However, their scope is limited to the 
highly optimized version of AODV that runs in a 
trusted environment because the safety and 
efficiency must be better at the same time. 
 
2.2. Security Issues of Black Hole Attacks 
Authors in [7] proposed a solution for 
collective black hole attack in MANETs called 
PCBHA. They modified basic AODV routing 
protocol with Computer simulation using 
GLOMOSIM (Global Mobile Simulator) to 
achieve the required security with minimal delay 
and overhead. The study focuses on making use of 
“fidelity tables” and assigning fidelity levels to 
the participating nodes. The proposed algorithm 
makes use of Minimum threshold value used for 
the simulation and took 2 units as a test case. To 
find a valid route the proposed solution tries up to 
a maximum of RREQ_RETRIES TIMES at the 
maximum TTL value, Otherwise, declare no valid 
route is found. They did an experiment through 
GloMoSim simulation. The results for packet 
delivery ratio increased around 90% using 
PCBHA and 30% using AODV. From this result, 
their approach shows enhancement in the 
percentage of packets received through AODV 
less than 60% over their system in the presence of 
cooperative black hole attack. Although the 
average end-to-end delay is not high, but the 
important point in their study was they have 
solution for collective black hole attack and made 
fidelity tables. However, their scope is limited to 
ways to reduce the delay in the network due to the 
exchange of fidelity packet in PCBHA to achieve 
security. 
Kurosowa, et al. [8] propose a new black 
hole detection method based on dynamic update 
training data and simulation on AODV. The study 
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focuses on the changing of DSN during the 
routing discovery in deferent stats. The average 
detection rate is increased by more than 8% and 
the average false positive rate is decreased by 
more than 6%. This method shows significant 
effectiveness in detecting the black hole attack.  
Weerasinghe and Fu [9] Modify AODV 
protocol by introducing Data Routing Information 
(DRI) table and cross checking using Further 
Request (FREQ) and Further Reply (FREP). 
Simulation results present a good performance in 
terms of better throughput rate and minimum 
packet loss percentage over Deng’s solutions [10] 
and AODV. Furthermore, they implement 
simulation of the proposed solutions for the 
cooperative black hole attacks, and add some 
changes to the Deng’s algorithm [10] to improve 
the accuracy in preventing black hole attacks. So, 
if there is no attack in the network, this scheme 
may be work very slowly and has a huge overhead 
for checking all nodes in a route.  
Many algorithms and techniques have been 
investigated to highlight the advantages and 
disadvantage of them. It is clear from all the 
mentioned works that there are two types of black 
hole attacks in MANETs. First is single black hole 
attacks, and co-operative black hole attacks. The 
security issue of the two types is important but the 
most important is the second type. If an algorithm 
can solve the problem of co-operative black hole 
attack, then the problem of single will be simple 
to solve by using the same algorithm.  
 
3. The EAODV 
 
We propose a RREQ-RREP intrusion 
detection system for mobile ad hoc network. In 
the intrusion detection system, each node has a 
routing table which includes all features about 
neighbours nodes. The routing table is shown in 
Table I. Every node can be computed the estimate 
time of routing discovery using the routing table 
after that it can be used as a heuristic value (h).  
 
3.1. Heuristic Search Algorithm A* 
The heuristic search A* is used to find a 
shortest path. It is utilized in many application and 
it is proved the successes into problems solving. 
The equation (1) is the original A* heuristic 
search algorithm [2], [3]. 
 
f(n) = g(n) + h(n) 
(1) 
 
Where: n is the node,   g(n) is the cost, h(n) is 
the estimated cost from n to the goal and f(n) is 
the estimated total cost of path from  n to the goal. 
 
 
 
TABLE I 
ROUTING TABLE OF EAODV PROTOCOL IN RREQ, RREP AND 
ROUTING TABLE 
 
RREP-AODV 
Table 
 
RREQ-EAODV 
Table 
 
EAODV Table 
 Broadcast ID Destination IP & 
DSN 
Destination IP 
Address  
Destination IP 
Address 
DSN-Flags 
Destination 
Sequence 
Number 
Destination Sequence 
Number 
Flags 
Source IP 
Address 
Source IP Address Network Interface 
Life Time Source Sequence 
Number 
Hop Count 
Hop Count Hop Count Next Hop 
Estimated Time Estimated Time Life Time 
Hash Function 
key value 
Hash Function Value Best Path to 
Destination 
 
3.2. The Proposed Algorithm 
We suppose g(n) equals to D is the hop 
count in the routing discovery, h(n) equal to h’(n) 
is the estimated time to destination node during 
the routing and f(n) is equal to f’(n) is the 
estimated total cost of path through n to the goal.  
Equation (2) shows the objective function of 
the proposed algorithm and Fig. 1.is included the 
Pseudo code of EAODV algorithm. 
 
f’(n) = h’(n) + D (2) 
 
In the following section, we present the idea 
of our Route Request for Discovery and Route 
Reply in EAODV. 
 
3.3. Route Discovery Example 
The example of implementation the A* 
algorithm with EAODV is illustrated in Fig. 2.  In 
this figure node 1 is a source node which it wants 
to send a packet to node 6. According to (2), the 
D(n) is a hop count of n, and h’(n) is the estimate 
time of n. f’ is the best value that calculating by 
(2), to update the routing table. However, we can 
calculate the estimate time as in Table II from (3), 
whenever the topology changes. 
 
𝐸𝑇(𝑛) =
𝑆𝑁(𝑛)
 𝐷(𝑛) ∗ 𝐷(𝑛)
 
(3) 
 
𝐸𝑇(𝑛) is estimated time from node n to destination 
node, 𝑆𝑁(𝑛) is the sequence number of node n, and 
𝐷(𝑛) is the number of hop count of node n. 
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Fig. 1.Pseudo code of EAODV algorithm 
 
 
 
Fig.  2.Topology example of six nodes (node 1 is a source 
node, node 6 is a destination node and nodes 2-4 are 
intermediate nodes). 
4. Experiments Setup, Results and Analysis 
 
We use NS2 simulator version 2.33 to 
experimenting three scenarios. The framework of 
three scenarios is shown in Fig. 3. Scenario 1 is to 
test the original AODV, scenario 2 is to test the 
black hole AODV and scenario 3 is to test the 
execution of the new formula of the proposed A* 
for finding the shortest path and securing the 
AODV protocol. The Simulation Parameters for 
scenario 1,2 and 3 are shown in Table III. 
   
TABLE II 
EXAMPLE OF ESTIMATED TIME OF ROUTE DISCOVERY TO  
THE DESTINATION (NODE 6) 
 EstimatedTime(sec.) Source 
Nodes 
5.0 1 
3.0 2 
3.5 3 
1.5 4 
2.0 5 
0.0 6 
 
TABLE III 
       SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR SCENARIOS 1,2,3 
Parameter Simulation1 Simulation2 Simulation3 
Simulation 
time 
1000 sec. 1000 sec. 1000 sec. 
Number of 
nodes 
50 50 50 
Routing 
Protocol 
AODV BlackHole-
AODV 
HashFunction-
AODV 
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) 
Pause time 2 sec. 2 sec. 2 sec. 
Maximum 
mobility 
60 m/sec. 60 m/sec. 60 m/sec. 
No. of 
sources 
1 1 1 
Map area 800m x 800m 800m x 800m 800m x 800m 
Transmission 
Range 
250m 250m 250m 
Number of 
malicious 
node 
1 1 1 
 
4.1. Performance Metrics 
Three performance indicators are used to 
measure our simulation which are End-to-end 
delay, Packet loss and Packet delivery ratio. 
End-to-end delay (𝜑) : The average time 
taken for a data packet to reach the destination 
including the delay of route discovery response 
process until transmission of data packets are 
made. Only the data packets successfully 
addressed and delivered are counted. The equation 
to calculate the End-to-end delay is shown in (4). 
 
𝜑 =
 (𝛼 − 𝛽)
 (𝛿)
 
(4) 
 
Where: α is arrival time, β is transmission time 
and δ is number of connections. So, when the end 
to end delay value goes lower, the better 
performance of the protocol will be reached. 
 
 
 
 
D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3 
1 
2 
3 
5 
4 
6 
D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3 
1 
2 
3 
5 
4 
6 
h’(2)=3.0 h’(4)=1.5 h’(6)=0 
f’(1)=h’(1)+D(1) 
f’(1)=5.0+0->5.0 
Current Position =1 
Best Bath=1 
f’(2)=h’(2)+D(2) 
f’(2)=3.0+1+0->4.0 
f’(3)=3.5+1+0->4.5 
Current Position =1 
Best Bath=2 
f’(2)=3.0+3->6.0 
f’(6)=0.0+3->3.0 
Current Position =4 
Best Bath=6 
3 
1 
2 
4 
6 
5 
f’(4)=1.5+2->3.5 
f’(5)=2.0+2->4.0 
f’(3)=3.5+2->5.5 
f’(1)=5.0+2->7.0 
Current Position =2 
Best Bath=4 
1: Start 
2: Broadcast RREQ from Source node to all neighbouring 
nodes. 
3:       setup hash function for all neighbouring nodes. 
4:               %Hash function phase 
5:        {  source node broadcast RREQ with Key 
          Disable all RREP 
       } 
6:               %Route discovery phase 
      { if Source starts broadcasting RREQ 
             then Do route discovery using (A* to 
find the shortest path to 
Destination) 
       } 
7:                %Description phase 
       {calculate Key and save new key  
then Do Destination unicast to 
source node 
        } 
8:                %Update routing tables 
        {if any Black hole node sends RREP 
without  new key then  
                                 {Delete path from routing  
table} 
                    } 
9:End 
% A* algorithm, a suggestion algorithm to find a shortest 
path from source node to destination node % 
Function A* Heuristic Search() return BestPath 
{ 
Inputs: HopCount, EstimatedTime, Current, Temp 
Local variables: FN, GN, HN 
Temp=GN(Source) 
For i=1 to Current do 
GN(i)=HopCount(i) + HN(i) 
If GN(i)<Temp Then Temp=GN(i) 
Else  NEXT i 
BestPath=Temp 
} 
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Fig. 3.The Simulation Framework of the three Scenarios  
Packet loss (𝜏): The total number of packet 
loss that lost during the execution of the 
simulation. The Equation of Packet loss is shown 
in (5). 
 
𝜏 = [ (𝜇)− (𝜗)]  ∗ (
100
 (𝜇)
) 
(5) 
 
Where: µ is the number of packets sent and 
𝜗  is the number of packets received. The lower 
value of the package loss means better 
performance of the protocol. 
Packet delivery ratio (PDR): the ratio of the 
number of data packets delivered to the 
destination. This metric shows the amount of data 
that arrived  at the destination. The PDR is shown 
in (6). 
 
𝑃𝐷𝑅 =
 (𝜗)
 (𝜖)
  
(6) 
 
Where: 𝜖  is the number of packets. The largest 
package delivery means that the best performance 
of the protocol. 
    
 
4.2. Packet Loss: Results and Discussion 
In Fig. 4. three scenarios; original AODV, 
black hole AODV and EAODV are compared. 
The increases in a packet loss ratio by the effects 
of the black hole attack will be degrades the 
performance of the AODV protocol and it maybe 
will cause a DoS attack. Compared to original 
AODV, the proposed EAODV indicates the 
EAODV minimizes the packet loss and improves 
the network performance. Packet loss was 21.41% 
in AODV but it increases with black hole 28.32% 
after that EAODV improve the percentage 
24.96%. 
Comparison between the decrease of packet 
loss with black hole AODV with the result of with 
EAODV means some improvements were 
conducted in avoiding the black hole attack. After 
the original AODV packet loss was increase 7.8 
% with black hole AODV, packet loss  was 
decrease to 3.36 % with EAODV. 
4.3. Average End-to-End Delay: Results and 
discussion 
Fig. 5. shows the comparison of the average 
End-to-End delay of the three scenarios. The 
 
RESULTs 
Analysis 
Awk file Graph file 
NAM  +  Trace 
CBR File  +  Scn File 
Scn1-Normal AODV Scn2- AODV-BH Scn3-E AODV 
CBR                      Movement File Scn                       Topology File 
NAM                    Nomination File Trac                      Tracing File 
Awk                      Analysis Awk 
File   
Graph                  Graphical result 
File  
RESULTS              Final results of 
all Files  
Scn1-Normal AODV  Scenarios1 
with normal AODV Protocol 
BH                        Black Hole   Scn2-AODV-BH  Scenarios2 
normal AODV + Black Hole Nodes 
CBR                      Movement File Scn3-E AODV  Scenarios3 
Enhancement AODV+ Black Hole 
Nodes 
NAM                    Nomination File Scn                       Topology File 
Awk                      Analysis Awk 
File   
Trac                      Tracing File 
RESULTS              Final results of 
all Files  
Graph                  Graphical result 
File 
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average End-to-End Delay increases with the 
existing of black hole. This delay degrades the 
performance of the network and causes more 
delay time when packets try to reach the 
destination node. Furthermore, when we compare 
the original AODV with the proposed protocol 
EAODV, the result indicated that EAODV 
minimizes the Average End-to-End Delay and 
improves the network performance. The 
percentage of delay was 29% with black hole 
node comparing with original AODV. This 
percentage was about 11.09% with EAODV.   
 
Fig. 4.Packet Loss Percentage for AODV, Black Hole AODV 
and EAODV 
 
 
Fig. 5. The average end-to-end delay for AODV, Black Hole 
AODV and EAODV 
 
4.4. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): Results and 
discussion 
Graphs in Fig. 6. shows the PDR for the 
three scenarios; We can see from the graphs that 
the packet delivery ratio does not increase with 
the existing of the black hole in the network. The 
packets were reach to destination from source 
node was 479.77 in total for standard AODV, 
469.56 for AODV with black hole nodes and 
447.43 for EAODV. So we can see that the 
overall PDR of EAODV does not degrade 
significantly due to the implementation of security 
algorithm. 
 
 
Fig. 6.The Packet Delivery Ratio for AODV, Black Hole 
AODV and EAODV 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has proposed defence mechanism 
against a cooperative black hole attack in a 
MANET that relies on AODV routing protocol 
named as EAODV Protocol. The proposed 
EAODV modifies the standard AODV and 
optimizes the routing process by incorporating A* 
search algorithm into the AODV routing process. 
The A* algorithm uses the value of hop count and 
the estimate time as input. One-way hash function 
is used to secure hop count value. The 
experimental results showed that EAODV is able 
to improve the performance of the network while 
securing from black hole attack. 
As for future work we plan to consider 
implementation of more complex black hole 
attacks as well as other routing protocols such as 
DSR, CBRP, ZRP. 
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